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If they are to be attained, the objectives set in the Kyoto Protocol will impose fundamental
changes on the structure of North America s economy. This text highlights the extent of
the Kyoto challenge by clearly describing the historical inertia in terms of total market
shares for different production technologies of the North American electricity industry. It
also compares two potential scenarios of the industry changes needed to attain the Kyoto
objectives. The results obtained suggest that it will be virtually impossible to reach the
Kyoto objectives within the electricity industry.
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1. Introduction
In November, 1997, the Kyoto Conference on Climate Change sparked a world-wide
examination of the measures needed to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The
Kyoto Protocol specifies average reductions of GHG emissions of 7% for Annex I
countries for the period 2008-2012. For Canada and the United States the specified
reductions are 6% and 7%, respectively.
1 Even though ratification of the protocol is far
from certain
2, a large number of domestic as well as international working groups have
been exploring different ways of contributing to a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions
for the 2008-2012 timeframe.
3
It is reasonable to believe that if this protocol is ratified and honoured, the world will
undergo technological revolutions in all industrial areas directly or indirectly related to
energy. However, some economic sectors will be more heavily hit than others. In the
business-as-usual (BAU) forecasts, absolute levels of CO2 emissions as well as projected
increases in emission levels in the electricity sector continue to be very high relative to
other industrial sectors in North America. The United States government forecasts
emission increases of 43% in this sector between 1990 and 2010 (see figures 1 and 2,
drawn from EIA (2000)). Accordingly, if the U.S. electricity sector is to meet the Kyoto
commitments, the 7% reduction in CO2 emissions with respect to the 1990 level will
require a 54% reduction relative to the BAU scenario.
4 This staggering figure is what
originally prompted us to analyze the electricity industry.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the stage by presenting a picture of
historical and forecasted market shares for the major electricity generation technologies in
the United States. Section 3 proposes two stylized alternative solutions for market share
changes which would meet the Kyoto targets in the U.S. electric industry. Section 4
analyzes and compares historical market share adaptation rates to the adaptation rates
                                                   
1 All   em  issions reducti  ons are measured wi  th respect   to 1990 em  ission levels. 
2 As of January 13 2000, 84 countr  ies had si  gned the the Pr  ot  ocol, whil  e only 22 countri  es
had rati  fied i  t.   No Annex I   countri  es have rati  fied t  he Pr  ot  ocol. More im  portantl  y,   ratif  icati  on
by t  he Unit  ed States remains in seri  ous doubt.
3  The  world  wi  de  web  pr  ovides  a  weal  th  of  infor  mat  ion  on  cl  im  ate  change  and  on  the
di  ff  erent ar  eas of negocit  ati  on and r  esear  ch.   A good place to begi  n sear  ching for int  ernat  ional
information  is  the  Unit  ed  Nations  Fr  amewor  k  Conventi  on  on  Cl  imate  Change  sit  e
(UNF  CCC): ht  tp:  //www.unfccc.  de/  . Inf  orm  ati  on on the process in the Unit  ed St  ates can be
found  at  htt  p:/  /www.  epa.gov/  global  warmi  ng/  .  Inf  or  mat  ion  on  the  curr  ent    st  at  us  of  the
Canadian pr  ocess is avai  lable at   ht  tp://  www.nccp.ca/html  /index.htm .
4 I  n Canada, the pr  oj  ect  ed incr  ease of em  issions over   the same peri  od is 24% (NCCP   (1999))  .
The required percent  age reducti  on of   em  issions woul  d be somewhat sm  al  ler   than in the U.S  .,
y e t   w o u l  d   s t  i l  l   b e   a n   i m p o r t  a n t    a m  o u n t .    B e c a u s e   o f    t h e   r e l  a t  i v e   s i  z e   o f    t h e   U . S  .   e l  e c t r i  c i t  y
industr  y  in  the  Nort  h Am  er  ican  market,    and  the  more  im  por  tant  reducti  ons  for  the  U.S. 
industr  y than the Canadian industr  y, the rest   of   the paper focuses on t  he U.S  .3
implied by the stylized alternative solutions. Section 5 sheds more light on the question by
discussing several factors which might affect the speed with which the electric industry
will be able to adapt. Finally, Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
2. Market shares in the U.S. electricity generation sector
An analysis of figure 1 shows the following transitions in past and forecasted market
shares for electricity generation in the United States
5.
•   Coal s market share grew until the middle of the 1950s, dropped sharply between 1965
and 1972 due to increased oil consumption, then rose markedly once again from 1978
to 1985. Since this time, coal-fired power stations have had a fairly constant market
share. The inherent flexibility of these power stations seems to provide a way of
adjusting generation so as to respond to variations in demand.
•   Contrary to coal, which, year in year out, has kept its market share, oil was only
popular for a short time, namely between 1964 and 1973. After a hesitant few years,
the second oil crisis in 1979 convinced the electricity industry to abandon oil once and
for all. Between 1979 and 1985, oil lost all the market share it had gained in the 1960s,
and, since 1985, oil accounts for a only small share of the American electricity
generation market.
•   Natural gas was likewise affected by the oil crisis of the 1970s. After undergoing
constant growth in the 1950s and 1960s, the market share of natural gas began to drop
in the 1970s. It was not until 1989 that this energy source was once again considered
as an alternative to nuclear energy and coal. Since this time, natural gas has become
the preferred source of energy for new electricity generation. However, as demand for
electricity is growing more slowly than in the past, the portrait of electricity generation
is  also  changing  slowly  and  the  natural  gas  market  share  has  thus  not  grown
significantly in the last 10 years.
•   Nuclear energy and renewables (principally hydroelectricity, at least in the historical
data) show decreasing market shares for several reasons. With regard to the former,
public opposition and the changing perception of risk due to deregulation have resulted
in little hope for capacity additions, or even plant-life extensions, in the decades to
come. For the case of hydroelectricity, the exhaustion of economically developable
sites as well as increased environmental concerns with site development are important
constraints to future development, and as a result, market share falls. Other forms of
renewable do not, as yet, offer sufficient promise to increase market share of this
segment.
                                                   
5 Sour  ce˚  : E  IA (2000)4
The above scenario, the EIA business-as-usual (BAU) scenario which does not integrate
the Kyoto concerns, thus offers no surprises. Seen from this viewpoint, only the natural
gas and coal industries are able to maintain or increase market share between now and the
year 2020. This tendency thus gives us an indication of the extent of the change needed if
the American electricity industry is to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. Given that the
emissions from the electricity sector in 2010 will be 43% greater than in 1990 in the
American scenario in question, there is good reason to conduct a specific analysis of this
sector.
Table 1 and figure 2 summarize the EIA BAU emission projections for oil, gas and coal in
the electricity sector.
Table 1: Annual CO2 Emissions in the U.S. electricity sector (Megatons)
1990 1997 2010 2020





















Sour ce:   EI A  (2000) 
In short, if the Kyoto Protocol is ratified, the U.S. electricity industry will have to undergo
drastic changes to meet the GHG emissions reduction targets.
6 In order to abide by the
Kyoto Protocol, the first task will be to reverse the current tendency clearly in favour of
thermal generation. Favourable conditions must then be created to allow cleaner forms of
generation to penetrate the market. This raises a fundamental question, namely what are
reasonable  deadlines  for  these  conditions  to  be  met?  Furthermore,  assuming  that
governments agree on an efficient process to convert the current energy system, how fast
could this be accomplished?
3. Alternative Solutions
Assuming that electricity demand continues to grow, meeting the objectives of the Kyoto
Protocol would require alternative solutions that would completely change the portrait of
the North American electricity industry. There are obviously several possible scenarios
                                                   
6 Thi  s paper wi  ll   not addr  ess the issue of   the all  ocation of em  ission reducti  on targets between
sect  ors of   t  he economy. Obvi  ously the el  ectri  cit  y sect  or woul  d be able to reduce em  issions by
less if   ot  her sect  ors of   the economy reduced by more. The point   being made here is that 
em  issions in the el  ectri  cit  y sect  or are so important  , and forecast to gr  ow by so much, that 
fundamental  changes  in  this  sect  or  wi  ll    be  required  in  or  der  for  the  U.S.    to  meet    the
objecti  ves set out   by t  he Kyoto Pr  ot  ocol.5
and the optimal solution might well be a combination of various new energy technologies.
So as to illustrate the overall context and provide an idea of the scale of the expected
changes, we have contrasted two potential scenarios.
Scenario 1: Natural gas and coal are replaced by sources with very low CO2 emissions.
There is increased electricity trade between Canada and the United States. Canada s
economically  developable  hydroelectric  potential,  a  total  of  roughly  190  TWh,  is
developed for export to the United States. A large number of coal-fired power stations are
replaced by nuclear power stations. The lifetime of current nuclear power stations is
extended.
Scenario 2: North American coal-fired power stations are replaced by high-performance
natural gas power plants, for the most part combined cycle units.
These scenarios obviously do not take into account all possible changes, such as the
impact of local wind power stations, demand side management and the replacement of
current coal-fired power stations by better performing stations using CO2 sequestration.
Nonetheless,  the  two  chosen  scenarios  each  represent,  in  their  own  way,  possible
tendencies that have been observed in the past. It must be understood that any other
scenarios should be on the same scale since the costs of the different alternative energy
forms must be considered.
The implementation of scenarios 1 and 2 to attain the Kyoto objectives within the
electricity sector is illustrated in figures 3 and 4. These figures clearly indicate that such
scenarios bring about large discontinuities in market shares. It is thus far from obvious that
the electricity industry can change at this rate, an observation which is at the heart of our
analysis, described in the next two sections.
4. Market Adaptation Rate
By estimating each energy form s market share in the electricity sector, a graph of the
historical rate of change of the particular energy form s market share is drawn. This rate of
change is interpreted as the technology s ability to adapt or to respond to market signals.
This historical market share, and characteristics of the evolution or change in market
shares can then be compared to Kyoto-type scenarios so that the realism of the latter can
be judged.
To estimate the evolution of market share, the following methodology was used:
•   Market share was smoothed for each electricity generation technology using a spline
function.
•   This function was then differentiated to obtain the rates of change of these market
shares.6
The results of analysis for coal, natural gas and nuclear are presented in figures 5 through
10.
The comparative analysis of past rates of change with those that would ensue from the two
Kyoto scenarios leads to certain conclusions for each scenario:
Scenario 1: a marked increase in nuclear energy and hydroelectricity
•   In scenario 1, the rate of decline of coal market shares seems not completely
unrealistic. With respect to coal, for example, the market share would drop from 57%
to 26%. Over 10 years, the annual decrease in market share would be around 3.0%. It
is worth noting that, from 1965 to 1971, the average decrease in market share for coal
was 1.66%. However, the maximum decrease was 2.5%.
•   On the other hand, the growth rates proposed for nuclear and renewable energy have
never occurred in the past. Scenario 1 presupposes that the capacity of the nuclear
industry would increase by a factor of 2.2 over 10 years from 2000. The annual
required growth rate would be 8.2%. This would obviously be an extraordinary
change when we stop to think that the maximum market share increase that this
industry has ever seen was around 2% per year and that, in addition, this industry is
currently in decline.
•   With respect to hydroelectricity (or renewables), the scenario proposes two drastic
changes. First, the proposed growth rate is in the order of 5.1% per year. Not once
since World War II, however, has hydroelectricity seen such growth rates. What is
more, this scenario implies that Canada exports to the south will increase by a factor of
at least 13. It seems highly unlikely, if not impossible, to imagine this level of
construction of hydro (generation and transmission) capacity in the next decade, both
because of the lack of economical sites and the intense public opposition to such
massive  development.  Likewise,  such  a  substantial  increase  in  other  forms  of
renewable is highly unlikely.
Scenario 2: replacement of coal by natural gas
•   In the past, the greatest annual decline that has ever been observed in coal s market
share was roughly 2.5%. Scenario 2 proposes an annual decrease of 4.2% between
2000 and 2010. Though this is possible, this decline would create significant social
and economic disturbances and seems highly unlikely.
•   Scenario 2 presupposes a sustained growth rate over 10 years that would allow natural
gas to increase market share by 4.8% annually. This implies an annual growth rate in
the demand for gas in the order of 19.4%. The objective would be to multiply the 2000
capacity of natural gas power stations by a factor of 5.9. However, analysis of the
recent past shows us that, despite the very favourable context for natural gas, its7
market share has stagnated in the last few years. Scenario 2 therefore seems rather
implausible.
Table 2 summarizes the market share variations and annual growth rates associated with
the BAU scenario as well as with the two proposed scenarios.
Table 2: Changes in Energy Technologies from 2000 to 2010
Coal  Gas Nu  cl  ear Renewab  le
Mark  et share variati  on
 BAU scenari  o
  Scenario 1











4.  2% 
-0.6%
An  nu  al growt  h rate
(G  en  eration) 
 BAU scenari  o
  Scenario 1
  Scenario 2
1.  2% 
-5.7%
-11.  8%
6.  0% 
6.  0% 
19.4%
-0.9%
8.  2% 
-0.9%
0.  9% 
5.  1% 
0.  9% 
5. Reaction Time to an Event
The extent of the Kyoto challenges are easily understood when examined from another
angle, namely the market s reaction time to significant events or changes in economic
trends. Several major events have influenced energy market decision makers since 1949.
Namely the construction of the first nuclear reactor in 1956; the oil crises in 1973 and
1979; the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) in the United States in 1978;
the oil slump impact in 1985; the American deregulation of natural gas in 1985; and, more
recently, the deregulation of the electricity sector. All of these events have had short or
long term impacts on changes in market shares. An examination of figures 1 and 5 to 10 in
terms of these events allows us to deduce the reaction time by energy form.
5.1 Short Term Reactions
When examining short term reactions, a distinction must be made between a variation in
the use of an existing capacity and a change in capacity as such. Producers can generally
choose among various solutions to meet demand. Furthermore, they leave themselves
some latitude to be able to respond to the vagaries of supply and demand. The graph for8
coal from 1980 to the present clearly shows that existing capacity has acted as a buffer.
The variations in coal shares fluctuated by roughly 2% during this period.
This buffer phenomenon can be seen elsewhere, each industry displaying the ability to
react rapidly enough to events. For instance, following the 1973 oil crisis, the market share
of oil stabilized fairly quickly. On the other hand, it was not until the second oil crisis in
1979 that the market reacted strongly and abandoned oil altogether.
The same phenomenon can be observed in nuclear energy. Though the growth of nuclear
energy s market share slowed down after 1978, it was not until 1989 that the industry fell
definitively out of favour.
In short, there is a wait-and-see phenomenon that occurs before the market makes its long-
term reaction. On the other hand, though short-term reactions are quick, they usually
represent adjustments in the use of existing capacity.
5.2 Long Term Reactions
An analysis of each energy form provides no major surprises. Technologies that require
relatively little capitalization, such as oil and coal, can win or lose market shares fairly
quickly. For instance, these two energy forms had annual growth and decline rates in the
2% range after the second oil crisis.
As for technologies that require sizeable capitalization, such as nuclear energy, the
reaction time is obviously longer since the period between the decision to build and the
beginning of construction is at least ten years. Another characteristic of nuclear energy is
the fact that the accompanying environmental appraisals receive considerable media
coverage, which only adds to the time before construction begins. In other words, since we
know that there are presently no new American projects for nuclear power stations, it is
safe to say that it would be impossible to add to the current capacity of the nuclear
industry in the United States by the year 2010.
5.3 The Specific Case of New Technologies
An analysis of the nuclear industry shows us the time required for a new technology to
reach its maximum rate of market penetration. The first American nuclear reactor was
built in 1956. The maximum growth rate in market share occurred 18 years later, in 1974.
In any attempt to extrapolate from the above case to those of wind and solar power, the
limited potential of these renewable energy forms must be considered. Still, the rate of
growth of these energy forms is such that it is reasonable to believe that they will have a
long term impact on the world s energy balance. On the other hand, the fact of the
industry s inertia would seem to suggest a more cautious forecast as to the real impact of
these energy forms by the year 2010 and even 2020 or 2050. In the words of the World9
Energy Council (WEC (1993)), it is difficult to believe that government leaders and
policies, consumer behaviour, technology and the ability to produce and install this
technology will change the time limit set to meet the too optimistic estimates found in the
literature.
5.4 Capital Stock Renewal
There have always been sizeable capital needs in the energy industry, but these needs have
always been consistent with the time frame of investment profiles. The scenarios proposed
in this study would require greater capital stock renewal than has ever occurred in the past.
The optimal investment rate varies considerably depending on the various economic
sectors. Historically, the annual growth rate of capital stock has, on average, been below
5% since World War II. This historical rate is well below the rate needed to attain the
optimal results identified in reference scenarios 1 and 2.
5.5 Other Constraints
The above analysis of reaction time implicitly takes into account several of the constraints
of industry inertia, namely cost, the political context, equipment life-span, technological
maturity and the availability of capital stock. Our analysis of past experiences tells us that
political constraints and market mechanisms keep rapid change in check.
The useful life-span of thermal power stations is 20 years and that of nuclear power
stations, 30 years. In practice, however, it is well known that the decision to switch fuels
or change procedures takes much longer. Conservative industries and the strength of their
lobbies undoubtedly play a role. The nuclear industry, for instance, asserts that it is
possible to extend the life-span of currently existing plants. One thing is certain, however:
if all the nuclear power stations in North America were shut down in favour of thermal
power stations, the new choices discussed here would be delayed well beyond 2010. By
the same token, if the nuclear industry becomes lethargic in years to come, how soon
would a massive return to this energy form be possible?
Technological maturity represents another important factor in the analysis. Gas turbines
are now commercially available. Their competitiveness depends on changes in the price of
gas with respect to that of other energy forms, including coal. With respect to new
alternative energy forms, only the wind power industry can hope to survive one day
without subsidies. Its exceptional progress in the last decade makes this a distinct
possibility. Nonetheless, it is perhaps unreasonable to believe that this energy form will be
able to replace a significant number of thermal power stations by 2010.
Given the planetary objective set by Kyoto, will international cooperation necessarily
follow? Will there be increased availability of international development funds to make
the needed investments in developing countries? What risks will be acceptable? Which
energy forms will be promoted? How can another cause of this industrial inertia, namely10
the tendency of countries to give precedence to regional affairs over everything else,
including common international challenges, be circumvented? For example, how could the
development in Canada of sizeable hydroelectric projects for export to the United States
be encouraged? This constraint is obviously difficult to quantify.
6. Conclusion
In order to illustrate the extent of the changes required to honour the Kyoto Protocol, the
American electricity generation sector was briefly studied for the period 1949-1996. The
industry s historical inertia, represented by change in market shares, was compared to the
expected rate of change in the generation system by 2010. This comparison of the past
with the future leads us to an obvious conclusion, namely that there is every reason to be
sceptical about the American electricity industry s capacity to change its generation
system in time to meet the Kyoto objectives.
The required rate of future change of market shares is quite different from past rates,
which have rarely surpassed 2% per year. With respect to nuclear energy, for example, the
results show that a favourable context for the industry in the 1960s, combined with a
strong growth in electricity demand, gave rise to considerable growth in the share of
nuclear energy, with an average of 0.9% per year from 1967 to 1991. However, this 20%
increase of the nuclear energy market share over 24 years would have to be repeated in 10
years if a nuclear energy scenario was chosen.
The changes are just as unimaginable in a natural gas scenario in which coal would
disappear. On the one hand, the generation capacity of natural gas technologies would
have to increase by a factor of 6 by 2010. Despite a highly favourable context, however,
natural gas has stagnated over the last few years. What is more, such a scenario would
entail the disappearance of coal from the electricity industry. How believable can this
scenario be when one considers the fact that coal has maintained a relatively stable market
share of around 55% over the past 15 years? This scenario seems all the more unlikely
when we note that the main historical competitors of coal have been oil and nuclear
energy, not natural gas.
Another interesting phenomenon that this historical analysis has brought to light is the
industry s reaction time to events. Each industry can react fairly quickly to events. For
instance, the market share of oil stabilized fairly quickly after the 1973 crisis. However, it
was not until the second crisis that the market reacted strongly and abandoned oil. This
quick reaction time is less true, however, for capital intensive industries such as nuclear
energy and hydroelectricity where the reaction time is even slower.
Finally, by basing the analysis on past changes, it can be fairly confidently stated that
relative prices and resource availability were the main factors in electricity generation
choices.11
This analysis is evidently incomplete and deserves to be further developed. Several
different leads should be examined if we are to better understand the changes that are
possible at the North American scale. First, a regional analysis is necessary. Second, a
correlation analysis of the various economic factors that have influenced decision makers
in the past would also seem to be important. However, the main message, that historical
evidence suggests that the Kyoto objectives will be difficult to achieve within the U.S.
electricity sector, appears to be quite robust.
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Source˚:  EIA Outlook 2000Figure 2 Carbon Emissions˚: U.S. Electric Generators












Source EIA Outlook 2000Figure 3 Electricity Generation Share by fuel type (1950-2020)















Note: the lowest curve on the above graph represents the market share of oil.Figure 4 Electricity Generation Share by fuel type (1950-2020)
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Note˚: for ease of exposition, only the coal and gas curves are labelled in the above graph.
The other curves correspond to the market shares of renewables, nuclear and oil.Figure 5 Coal Market Share fit with spline function
Market shares for electricity produced from coal


























































































































































4Figure 7 Natural gas Market  Share fit with spline function
Market shares for electricity produced from natural gas






























































































































































5Figure 9 Nuclear Market Shares fit with spline function
Market shares for electricity produced from nuclear energy















































Figure 10 Change in nuclear  market share
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